A BLACK PERSPECTIVE ON MOUNT LAUREL II:

TOWARD A BLACK "FAIR SHARE"
Robert C. Holmes*
Although the minority poor continue to be acutely disadvantaged
in the search for decent housing, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 11)' declined to recognize race as a significantly
distinct variable affecting access to housing. The failure to recognize
this variable may explain why the court did not design a remedy
tailored to the particular needs of the minority poor.
A good starting point in analyzing the value to the black community of Mount Laurel II is a review of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
stated definition of its intended protected class. In 1975, the court
reviewed an argument that certain land use regulations of Mount
Laurel Township unconstitutionally precluded substantial segments
of the population from residing there by failing to allow for affordable
housing. Justice Hall, writing the majority opinion in Southern
Burlington County N.A.A. C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel I),2 declared that "[p]laintiffs represent the minority group
poor (black and Hispanic) seeking such quarters . . . [b]ut they are

not the only category of persons barred from so many municipalities
by reason of restrictive land use regulations." '3 It was the majority's
conclusion that the court should broaden the scope of its inquiry to
encompass all those persons who, like the minority poor, were similarly precluded from living in Mount Laurel "because of the limited
'
extent of their income and resources. N
Justice Hall's final blow to any individualized protection for the
original plaintiff minority group poor is contained in his words, "we
accept the representation of the municipality's counsel at oral argument that the regulatory scheme was not adopted with any desire or
intent to exclude prospective residents on the obviously illegal basis of
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race, origin or believed social incompatibility."-5 That is, black and
Hispanic poor were thrown in with the lot of all other members of
New Jersey society that might be excluded from housing opportunity
on the basis of their economic condition. Thus, early in the opinion, it
was evident that Mount Laurel I would not specifically expand the
scope of civil rights for minorities in New Jersey.
Despite the expansion of the protected class and the resulting
dilution of minority rights in Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court has acknowledged, on more than one occasion, that
exclusionary zoning is indeed a racial problem. In his Mount Laurel I
concurrence, Justice Pashman made it clear that the court was mindful of the negative aspects of including racial minorities in a broader
economic protected group. While he accepted Mount Laurel Township's representations 5 regarding unlawful racial discrimination, he
pointed out that "exclusionary zoning practices are also often motivated by fear of and prejudices against other social, economic, and
racial groups."-6 Shortly thereafter, Justice Pashman wrote a concurring opinion in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,7
the first significant test of Mount Laurel I. In Madison Township,
Justice Pashman reiterated his observation that "[e]xclusionary zoning
is also motivated to a large extent by long-standing social and racial
fears and prejudices. '"8
Finally, the court's unanimous 1983 decision in Mount Laurel II,
written by Chief Justice Wilentz, although containing no discussion of
purposeful racial discrimination in the enactment of exclusionary zoning ordinances, did in part suggest that there may be a constitutional
basis for deconcentrating New Jersey's cities. Significantly, Mount
Laurel II referred to a conclusion of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders by noting that "suburban exclusion [is] one of
the principal causes making America 'two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal.' "9
Notwithstanding clear indications that it was aware that racial
discrimination exacerbates the problems inherent in a minority
group's search for decent affordable housing in New Jersey, the supreme court has consistently defined the protected class in terms of

5 Id.
Id. at 196, 336 A.2d at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
72 N.J. 481. 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
8 Id. at 562,
371 A.2d at 1232 (Pashman. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted).
Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5 (quoting Report of The National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1 (1968)).
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economic condition for purposes of the Mount Laurel doctrine. An
hypothesis quickly emerges from these findings: Any judicial remedy
that purports to serve black or Hispanic interests yet does not specifically take into account race and racial discrimination is reasonably
certain to fall short of providing adequate protection for these minority groups. For the minority poor the demon has two heads: one
economic, the other racial.
That race is indeed a factor to be considered independent of
economic status, and that the minority poor are sufficiently distinguishable from the poor generally as to require a particularized remedy, are amply supported by statistical data. Race, as will be shown,
is a significant and distinct variable. From a national perspective, one
cannot ignore the overwhelming likelihood that in 1984, blacks will
"be discriminated against seventy-five percent of the time in the rental
housing market"; they will receive "thirty percent less value for their
housing dollar"; they "are twice as likely to live in substandard housing";10 and they will earn only sixty dollars for every one hundred
dollars earned by whites." It is also significant that the ratio of the rise
in the cost of housing to the rise in household incomes 2is far less
favorable for black households than for white households.1
A 1983 report of the National Urban Coalition points out that
"[b]etween 1970 and 1980 the median income of all [home] owners
([including] those who were [still paying for] their homes) rose 104 %
while the estimated value of [those] homes rose an alarming 300 % .""3
The report goes on to suggest that "for Black owners, the rise in
median income for the same period was 106 %, while the rise in the
estimated value of their homes was [only] 213% . "14 For the nation's
black renters, the situation follows a similar pattern. According to
The National Urban Coalition report:
Between 1970 and 1980 the median income for all renters rose
about 66 %. For Black renters the increase was about 74 %. During
the same period, the median increase in rent for all renters was
123%, while the increase for the Black renters was 129%. This
problem is particularly acute for the Black community when it is
noted that 56.1 % of all Black households were renter households.15

The National Urban Coalition, Peoples Platform (draft) 39 (May 30, 1983).
Id. at 5.
I
12 Id. at 95.
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Of equal importance to a concern for housing affordability is a
consideration of housing availability. The National Urban Coalition
offers the following observation with regard to this concern:
Generally, the housing supply in a given market is expanded by
new construction, diminished by demolitions and other losses, and
either increased or decreased by conversions and mergers. A recent
analysis by the Bureau of the Census indicates that "the ability of
households to avoid the adverse effects of loss of a dwelling removed from the (housing) inventory or to take advantage of newly
constructed housing opportunities is strongly influenced by income
levels and location of residence." Both of these factors " .

..

.work

to the disadvantage of Black households in gaining access to a full
range of housing opportunities. Many Black households continue to
have lower incomes than whites and to reside in older housing
located in the more central portions of metropolitan areas (where
demolition or other forms of loss are more likely and where new
construction-particularly of units at costs that many Blacks can
afford-is less likely)." The lack of availability is made worse when
the impact of displacement (essentially private sector-induced) is
considered. The Bureau of Census noted " . . . during the past

decade, Black central-city households were displaced from housing
at over four times the rate of white central-city residents. By comparison, during the 1960's, the Black displacement rate was about
6
2.6 times the white rate."'
In order to compare the extent of the economic and housing
plight of New Jersey's blacks to that of other residents of limited
economic means, we must understand what protections and social
goals the court set out to accomplish. As suggested earlier, the Mount
Laurel I court took judicial notice of the fact that only a handful of
New Jersey's low and moderate income residents could gain access to
"many municipalities [because] of restrictive land use regulations.' 7
Consequently, the court held that "a developing municipality . . .
must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there
8

. . .

including those of low

and moderate income.'
For those who expected the landmark Mount Laurel I case to
result in the opening up of the suburbs to many who had been

16

Id. at 95-96.

11Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
18 Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
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previously excluded, the result was indeed disappointing. A flood of
lengthy and expensive litigation followed Mount Laurel I, as New
Jersey's more affluent communities strenuously resisted the "undesirable" implications of the new law, analyzing and debating its every
detail and weakness. Eight years later, the supreme court endeavored
to clarify, once and for all, what was intended by the Mount Laurel
doctrine. In Mount Laurel II, the court declared: "[T]he State controls the use of the land, all of the land. . . .It cannot legislatively set
aside dilapidated housing in urban ghettoes for the poor and decent
housing elsewhere for everyone else."' 19
The court found that, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of equal protection and substantive due process, the general welfare must be furthered. This would be accomplished through
deconcentrating the urban poor by producing low and moderate income housing units in the suburbs. The underlying theory is that the
concentration of poverty in urban areas produces social problems
which have a negative impact on the state as a whole; therefore, the
removal of such concentrations would have widespread positive impact.

20

The court further developed this definition of a constitutional
basis and social goal in a footnote that reads in part:
The provision of lower income housing. in the suburbs may
help to relieve cities of what has become an overwhelming fiscal
and social burden. It may also make jobs more accessible for the
unemployed poor. Deconcentration of the urban poor will presumably make cities more attractive for businesses and upper income
residents to return to.
Cities, while most directly affected, are not the sole victims of
exclusionary zoning. The damage done by urban blight and decay
is in no wav confined to those who must remain in our cities. It
affects all of us. Violent crime and drug abuse spawned in urban
slums do not remain within city limits, they spread out to the
suburbs and infect those living there. Efforts to combat these diseases require expenditures of public dollars that drain all taxpayers,
urban and suburban alike. The continuing disintegration of our
cities encourages business and industry to leave New Jersey altogether, resulting in a drain of jobs and dollars from our economy.
In sum, the decline of our cities and the increasing economic segregation of our population are not just isolated problems for those left

19Mt.

Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.

20 Id. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5.
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behind in the cities, but a disease threatening us all. Zoning ordiare not
nances that either encourage this process or ratify its results
2
promoting our general welfare, they are destroying it. 1
In a subsequent footnote, the court set forth a means test for
defining low and moderate income. Moderate income was defined as
no greater than eighty percent and no less than fifty percent of the
median income of the area with adjustments for smaller and larger
families. Low income was defined as not exceeding fifty percent of the
median income of the area. 22 While it seems clear that the court
intended the new law to have the effect of deconcentrating urban
poverty, it is not as clear whether the court was fully aware of the
demographics regarding the poor living in New Jersey's cities. Presumably, the court considered the racial minority plaintiffs before
them to be reasonably protected as part of the larger low to moderate
income group of which they were a part.
A common perception is that the terms "urban" and "poor" are
synonymous with racial minorities. The following data 23 should enlighten many:
" Over fifty-five percent of the 925,000 black residents of New
Jersey are concentrated in the ten most populated urban aid
municipalities.

24

Over seventy-five percent of the total black population in New
Jersey reside in all forty-two urban aid municipalities.
We may conclude that, characteristically, New Jersey's black
residents are urban dwellers. Further,
" Only eleven percent of the 6,127,070 white residents of New
Jersey live in the ten most populated urban aid municipalities.
" Only twenty-seven percent of the total white population in New
Jersey reside in all forty-two urban aid municipalities.
We may conclude from this that, characteristically, New Jersey's
white residents are not urban dwellers. In order to assess the demographics accurately, however, overall composition must be considered:
"

22

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8.

23

The figures herein are calculated from data derived from STATE

21

DATA CENTER, NEW JERSEY

1980 CENSUS COUNTS OF POPULATION By RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN (Mar. 1981).
24 The term "urban aid municipality" refers to any of the 42 municipalities in the State of

New Jersey which receive state aid for the purpose of maintaining and upgrading their municipal
services, and offsetting local property taxes, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-178 (West
Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
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" In terms of the overall composition of the ten most populated
urban aid municipalities in New Jersey, the results are forty-four
percent black and fifty-six percent white.
" In terms of the overall composition of all forty-two urban aid
municipalities, the results are thirty-one percent black and sixtynine percent white.

Therefore, while a greater proportion of blacks than whites live in
New Jersey's urban areas, there are still significantly more white than
black urban dwellers.
Similarly, with regard to income, the number of urban whites far
exceeds the number of urban blacks who are eligible for housing
25
pursuant to the Mount Laurel II means test:
* 13,200 black families in the ten most populated urban aid mu-

nicipalities in New Jersey qualify as low income. 16,506 white

families qualify in this category.
* 18,183 black families in all forty-two urban aid municipalities in
New Jersey qualify as low income. 37,803 white families qualify
in this category.

* 15,331 black families in the ten most populated urban aid municipalities qualify as moderate income. 27,014 white families
qualify in this category.
* 20,907 black families qualify in all forty-two urban aid municipalities as moderate income. 59,934 white families qualify in this
category.

One could speculate from these demographic data that selection
criteria left unmonitored could result in apparent significant success
for the Mount Laurel mandate without accommodating a single black
family. If it is correct to conclude that one of the Mount Laurel II
court's principal aims was the integration of economic classes throughout New Jersey by way of the deconcentration of urban areas, then
based on the above calculations, blacks should occupy any new units
created pursuant to the new law in the ratio of 2.1:1 or 3.1:1 white to
black.
More specifically, in the category of low income, using the ten
most populated urban aid municipalities, a ratio would be created of
about 1.1:1 white to black. Using all forty-two urban aid municipali-

2' The figures herein are calculated from data derived from STATE DATA CENTER, NEW JERSEY
198o CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, MUNICIPAL PROFILES, VOLUME V: INCOME AND
POVERTY ESTIMATES FOR FAMILIES, HOUSEHOLDS AND PERSONS, Parts A and B (June 1983) [hereinafter cited as MUNICIPAL PROFILES].
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ties, the ratio would be closer to 2.1: 1 white to black. Similarly, in the
category of moderate income, using the ten most populated urban aid
municipalities results in a ratio of 2.1:1 white to black, and using all
forty-two urban aid municipalities results in a ratio of about 3.1:1
white to black.
Therefore, unless other criteria for reaching the protected class
are advanced, facially neutral selection criteria which, when applied
to applicants for "Mount Laurel" housing tend to upset the ratios set
forth above, should be regarded as suspect and rejected as constitutionally impermissible. Aside from a criterion which gives preference
to indigenous poor-that is, applicants who currently live in the
project area and also live in substandard housing-or to others who
are unable to afford to reside in the community where they work,
other criteria are likely to prove counterproductive to the goals expressed consistently throughout the entire line of Mount Laurel decisions.26
Justice Hall, in Mount Laurel I, squarely addressed this problem
and gave clear guidance for the structuring of any selection process:
Much industry and retail business, and even the professions, have
left the cities. Camden is a typical example. The testimonial and
documentary evidence in this case as to what has happened to that
city is depressing indeed. For various reasons, it lost thousands of
jobs between 1950 and 1970, including more than half of its manufacturing jobs. . . . A large segment of retail business faded away
with the erection of large suburban shopping centers. The economically better situated city residents helped fill up the miles of
sprawling new housing developments, not fully served by public
transit. In a society which came to depend more and more on
expensive individual motor vehicle transportation for all purposes,
low income employees very frequently could not afford to reach
outlying places of suitable employment and they certainly could
not afford the permissible housing near such locations. These people have great difficulty in obtaining work and have been forced to
remain in housing which is overcrowded, and have become more
and more substandard and less and less tax productive. There has
been a consequent critical erosion of the city tax base and inability
to provide the amount and quality of those governmental serv-

26

The mere proximity of an applicant's workplace to the project, and any criterion which

fails to give preference to applicants whose current housing is either substandard or located in
urban municipalities, are but a few examples of this shortcoming. See Mt. Laurel 1. 67 N.J. at
187, 336 A.2d at 731; Mt. Laurel II. 92 N.J. at 210 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5; see also Madison
Township, 72 N.J. at 556-58, 371 A.2d at 1229-30 (Pashman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
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ices-education, health, policy, fire, housing and the like-so necessary to the very existence of safe and decent city life. This category of city dwellers desperately needs much better housing and
living conditions that is available to them27now, both in a rehabilitated city and in outlying municipalities.
Judicial concern for the needs of city-dwellers, however, did not end
with Justice Hall's opinion. In Madison Township, Justice Pashman
offered similar guidance when he observed:
Exclusionary land use practices also contribute directly to the
rigid and relentless deterioration of our cities. In recent decades
industry and a large number of retail businesses have moved out of
the city and relocated in suburban shopping centers and industrial
parks. Meanwhile, lower income employees have been forced to
remain in the cities. This phenomenon in turn causes two developments-an increase in unemployment among low income workers
who cannot afford to reach the new sources of suitable employment
and a critical erosion of the urban tax base

...

28

Concern for commuting distances clearly is not intended to render life easier for one who has already escaped the city's grip. It is
instead a reference to the enhancement of job opportunity that closely
follows an expansion of housing opportunity. The remedy is intended
to expose low income workers to greater job markets by reducing the
financial and practical limitations of commuting. A low income applicant who lives within the walls surrounding the cities should be29given
a higher priority status than one who lives outside those walls.
Blacks generally do not work in suburban communities in and
around areas where Mount Laurel housing might be and is being
built. This is because of the combined effect of (1) the current lack of
affordable housing in those communities; (2) an inability to afford
long commutes; and (3) racial discrimination which has blocked them
from access to the few jobs and affordable housing units that may
have existed.
Placing emphasis on the proximity of the workplace to the project
site only perpetuates the vicious cycle which the Mount Laurel doctrine seeks to eliminate. Moreover, it produces a constitutionally indefensible "Catch 22": One needs a house near a job but one first needs
27

Mi. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 172-73, 336 A.2d at 724.
Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 558, 371 A.2d at 1230 (Pashman, J., concurring in part,

21

dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
21 CJ. id. (Justice Pashman noted that exclusionary zoning "builds a wall around the cities
over which only the well-to-do can escape").
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the job to qualify for access to such a house. Notwithstanding their
economic limitations, white applicants, unrestrained by racial prejudices, may well have escaped many of the indicia of substandard
living. To deviate from the strictest interpretation of the court's mandate is to greatly skew the selection process in favor of whites as
opposed to racial minorities. For similar reasons, racial minorities can
be properly protected within a group of economically disadvantaged
persons only if the "means test" measures actual economic worth and
not merely current income. Although a given family satisfies the
Mount Laurel II means test in terms of current income, if it does not
have substandard assets and does not live in a substandard house
located in a substandard area, its members are not in that class of
persons whose interest the Mount Laurel II decision intended to protect. Hence, such a family should not be favored.
The fundamentally fairest combination of criteria must remain
the genuinely low or moderate income family living in an urban area
in a substandard dwelling. Given the clear state of the law in New
Jersey which disallows the use of quotas to remedy even intentional
discrimination, 30 and the absence of supportive language in Mount
Laurel II which would have created racial preferences in selection
criteria, this first order priority both satisfies the court's stated aims
and maximizes the odds that the benefits to a black family will be
equal to those accruing to other members of the protected class. If
these fundamental rules are not adhered to in the design of selection
criteria, blacks will be better off arguing for an open lottery system
based only on a fair means test and designated regions of which the
project area is a part. At the very worst, at least statewide, blacks
make up one in every six low income residents, and one in every nine
31
moderate income residents.
If the tenets of Mount Laurel II are carried out in spite of existing
negative attitudes and inclinations regarding racial integration, a black "fair share" of newly created units might represent a
reasonable expectation. If the inclusion of blacks and other minorities
in the larger group of economically disadvantaged persons totally
ignores the effects of racial discrimination, however, then a terrible
irony will result: The court which espoused so vigorously the legal
principle that when determining the validity of land use regulation,

" Cf. Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5 (1976) (use of racial quota remedy violates N.J.
CONST. art. I, para. 5; art. VII, § I, para. 2).
"' Calculated from data derived from MUNICIPAL PROFILES, siipra note 25 and accompanying
text.
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the "effect" and not necessarily the "intent" is controlling, will have
failed to remedy the effects of a long recognized constitutional wrong
on members of the Mount Laurel protected class.
In that event, the original plaintiff minority group poor (blacks
and Hispanics) described by Justice Hall would have to return to the
court and insist this time that their more individualized interests and
rights be focused upon.

